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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 970426-CA 
v. : 
MARK ANDERSON, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction on 14 counts 
of fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 
1993), in the First Judicial District Court, Cache County, the 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL and STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Does a statute providing that a physician "cannot, without 
the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action/' apply 
in a criminal action? 
A trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of 
law and thus reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
2. Where a person consults physicians for the purpose of 
fraudulently obtaining controlled substances, are his communications 
protected by rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence? 
"The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court, 
which [this Court will] review for correctness, giving no deference 
to the trial court's determination." Price v. Armour, 949 P. 2d 1251, 
1254 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 
842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992)). 
3. Assuming arguendo that the physician-patient privilege 
otherwise applies, may defendant assert that privilege at trial after 
having waived it by not objecting to the doctors' testimony in the 
preliminary hearing? 
See standard of review for issue No. 2. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are reproduced in addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17a-604 (4) (b) (Supp. 1996); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3) (Supp. 1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1995); 
Utah R. Evid. 506; 
Utah R. Evid. 507. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information with 20 counts 
of fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription (R. 
a-j). At the conclusion of a two-day trial, the jury convicted 
defendant on 14 counts and acquitted defendant on six counts (R. 
2 
68-71, 108-14). Defendant was sentenced to statutory terms, but 
his sentences were stayed and defendant was placed on probation (see 
unpaginated Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 120-21) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Motion in Limine 
Defendant filed a Motion in Limine Respecting Physician-Patient 
Privilege (R. 46) . The motion sought an "Order limiting the Plaintiff 
in the presentation of evidence as to testimony by defendant's 
treating physicians and respecting the records of said treating 
physician with respect to communications between Defendant and 
Defendant's treating physicians and impressions gained by Defendant's 
treating physician in the course of said treatment" (R. 46) . The 
trial court denied defendant's motion in limine to suppress under 
the physician-patient privilege (R. 150-51). 
At the hearing on this motion, the court noted that the statutory 
privilege found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1995) was expressly 
limited to civil actions (R. 150-51) . With respect to the equivalent 
court rule, rule 506, Utah Rules of Evidence, the court reasoned 
that while the rule is not expressly limited to civil actions, 
applying it in the present context would be inconsistent with Utah 
1
 Except as noted, facts are stated in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1205-06 (Utah 1993); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989). 
3 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993), which criminalizes the obtaining 
of controlled substances by misrepresentation or non-disclosure (R. 
151). 
The court denied defendant's motion and ruled that the State 
could examine the physicians limited to the areas identified in the 
prosecutor's memorandum (R. 151, 55-60) . This ruling permitted the 
State to ask the physicians questions such as whether they had 
prescribed a controlled substance to defendant, whether defendant 
had disclosed that his primary care physician had already issued 
a prescription, and whether this information would have caused the 
physician not to issue the prescription, and "logical extensions" 
of such questions (R. 57, 115, 151-52). Defendant's motion was 
granted as to "all other material" (R. 152). 
Trial facts 
Defendant was treated by his primary care physician, Dr. Lars 
Bergeson of Logan, Utah, during the period October 1992 through 
November 1994; Dr. Bergeson prescribed Tussionex, a cough 
suppressant, and Lortab, a pain reliever (R. 217-26, 236-41) . Both 
are synthetic narcotics (R. 222-25). He also refilled defendant's 
prescription for Bantus, another narcotic cough medication (R. 229) .2 
Drs. Cory Johnson, Russell Anderson, Douglas Hyldahl, Bruce 
Isaacson, and Glen Mortensen all testified that, during the same 
2
 None of the charges are based on medications prescribed by 
Dr. Bergeson (R. 224) . 
4 
period, they all prescribed Tussionex and other controlled substances 
containing the narcotics hydrocodone or codeine to defendant; that 
defendant did not inform them that he was receiving the same 
controlled substances from another source; and that they would not 
have issued the prescriptions had defendant disclosed this information 
(see R. 245-93, State's exhibits 8-17).3 
Records from Payless Pharmacy, Shopko Pharmacy, Wal-Mart Pharmacy, 
Fred Meyer Pharmacy, Reed's Pharmacy, Spence's North Pharmacy, and 
Spence's South Pharmacy established that the narcotic medications 
were dispensed to defendant—the equivalent of more than 50 four-ounce 
bottles over 11 months (see R. 313-43, 377; State's exhibits 18-24) . 
When questioning exceeded the limits of the court's order, 
defendant's objections were sustained (see, e.g., R. 227-28, 231-32, 
241, 259). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the physician-patient 
privilege is a relatively recent innovation. Most legal scholars 
condemn it and those states which recognize it tend to limit its 
scope. Defendant here is not entitled to the protections of Utah's 
physician-patient privilege to shield himself from charges of 
fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription. 
3
 Portions of medical records relating to defendant's 
symptoms or any diagnosis were masked prior to trial, leaving 
visible only his name, certain dates, and prescription notations 
(see State's exhibits 5-24). 
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1. The trial court correctly ruled that admission of the doctors' 
testimony against defendant did not violate the physician-patient 
privilege as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1995) . Defendant's 
claim fails because the Utah Supreme Court has held that this statute 
does not apply in criminal cases. 
2. a. Defendant's claim that admission of the doctors' testimony 
violated the physician-patient privilege found in rule 506(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence, must also fail. By its own terms, the physician-
patient privilege protects only information communicated for the 
purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient. Accordingly, 
communications between a patient and physician having a criminal 
purpose are not protected by the privilege. Defendant's purpose 
in consulting the doctors was to fraudulently obtain prescriptions 
for controlled substances, not to seek treatment; therefore, the 
trial court correctly refused to apply the physician-patient 
privilege. 
b. Defendant's claim that admission of the doctors' testimony 
violated the physician-patient privilege as codified in rule 506 
fails for a second reason. The trial court correctly held that 
applying rule 506(b) would be inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8 (Supp. 1993) , which criminalizes the obtaining of controlled 
substances by misrepresentation or non-disclosure. Allowing the 
defendant to invoke the physician-patient privilege against a charge 
6 
of prescription fraud would make this crime impossible to prosecute. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly refused to apply the privilege. 
3. Assuming arguendo the physician-patient privilege had 
application to this case, defendant waived the privilege by failing 
to assert it when the physicians testified in the preliminary hearing. 
Failure to object on privilege grounds constitutes waiver of the 
privilege. Furthermore, courts generally hold that once the privilege 
is waived it cannot be reasserted. Accordingly, defendant's failure 
to assert the privilege when the physicians testified at the 
preliminary hearing constituted a waiver of the privilege, which 
cannot be reasserted at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
"For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as 
a fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every man' s 
evidence." Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996) (quoting 
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)). Exceptions to 
this principle "are not lightly created nor expansively construed, 
for they are in derogation of the search for truth." United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
"Testimonial privileges are permitted only to the very limited 
extent that excluding relevant evidence 'has public good transcending 
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means 
for ascertaining truth.'" In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2nd Cir. 
7 
1983) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which dates from the reign 
of Elizabeth I, no physician-patient privilege existed at common 
law; it is a "purely statutory innovation." 8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore 
on Evidence § 2286, at 528, § 2290 at 542, § 2380 at 818-19 
(McNaughten rev. 1961); 2 Jack b. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence, 5 504[01] at 504-9 (1994). 
"Legal scholars have been virtually unanimous in their 
condemnation of it." Id. See, e.g. , 8 Wigmore § 2380a at 831 ("It 
is certain that the practical employment of the privilege has come 
to mean little but the suppression of useful truth"); McCormick' s 
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 105 at 228 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 
1972) ("More than a century of experience with the statutes has 
demonstrated that the privilege in the main operates not as the shield 
of privacy but as the protector of fraud"). 
"[I]n recognition of the privilege's undesirable effects," states 
which have adopted a general medical privilege "have whittled away 
at the privilege so that its scope has been considerably reduced." 
2 Weinstein fl 504[1] at 504-10. 
No federal physician-patient privilege exists, although the 
United States Supreme Court recently adopted a psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. See Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931. In justifying this 
privilege, the Court noted that psychotherapy requires disclosure 
8 
of "facts, emotions, memories, and fears." Id. at 1928. In contrast, 
"[t]reatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed 
successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective 
information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic 
tests." Id. 
Both the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Evidence recognize 
the physician-patient privilege. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (4) 
(1995); Utah R. Evid. 506. Defendant relies on both. 
POINT I 
BY ITS PLAIN LANGUAGE, THE STATUTORY PHYSICIAN-PATIENT 
PRIVILEGE IS LIMITED TO CIVIL ACTIONS 
Defendant claims that admission of the doctors' testimony violated 
the physician-patient privilege as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-
8 (1995) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (4) (1995) provides in pertinent part 
(emphasis added) : "A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent 
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information 
acquired in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him 
to prescribe or act for the patient." 
Defendant's contention fails because the Utah Supreme Court 
has held that this statute does not apply in criminal cases. State 
v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 272-73, 254 P. 142, 143 (Utah 1927); see Br. 
Aplt. at 11. Indeed, given the statute's plain language, a court 
could hardly conclude otherwise. See OfKeefe v. Utah State Retirement 
9 
Bd. , 929 P. 2d 1112, 1115 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ; Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997). 
Defendant asserts that section 78-24-8 "should be construed 
liberally to afford defendant due process; the distinction made by 
the legislature is invidious and has no rational basis." Br. Aplt. 
at 7. Because this assertion is supported by neither authority nor 
analysis, it must be rejected. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 
966 (Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); 
State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v. 
Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1100 n.3 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 
913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 569 n.3 
(Utah App. 1994); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
POINT II 
WHERE A PERSON CONSULTS PHYSICIANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, HIS 
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THOSE PHYSICIANS ARE NOT PROTECTED BY 
RULE 506, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that admission of the doctors' testimony violated 
the physician-patient privilege found in rule 506(b), Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Br. Aplt. at 7. 
Rule 506 reads in pertinent part: 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information 
is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of 
diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a 
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose 
and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) 
diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by 
a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information 
obtained by examination of the patient, and (3) information 
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transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health 
therapist, and persons who are participating in the 
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician 
or mental health therapist . . . 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to 
a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, 
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any 
claim or defense, . . . 
A. Defendant is not entitled to the protection of the 
rule because the purpose of his visits was not to seek 
treatment, but to fraudulently obtain drugs. 
The scope of a privilege "is limited by its underlying purpose." 
State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah 1980) (construing 
forerunner of Utah R. Evid. 505, Government informer privilege). 
By its own terms, the physician-patient privilege protects only 
information communicated "for the purpose of diagnosing or treating 
the patient." Utah R. Evid. 506(b) . It follows that the privilege 
may not be claimed by a person who consults a physician for a purpose 
other than diagnosis or treatment. Moutzoukos v. Mutual Benefit 
Health & Accident Ass'n, 69 Utah 309, 318, 254 P. 1005 (Utah 1927) 
(error to exclude information obtained by physician in employer-
required pre-employment examination). 
This reasoning applies with particular force if the purpose 
of the "patient" was criminal. "Communications between a patient 
and a physician having for their object the commission of a crime 
are not within the physician-patient privilege." 81 Am. Jur. Witnesses 
11 
§ 482 (1992) . "If the patient's purpose in the consultation is an 
unlawful one, as . . . to obtain narcotics in violation of law, . 
. . the law withholds the shield of privilege." McCormick' s Handbook 
of the Law of Evidence § 99 at 215 (Edward W. Cleary, ed., 1972). 
See also 3 Jones on Evidence (6th ed.) § 21.29 at 823 
(" [c] ommunications between physician and patient, however confidential 
they may be, are held not to be privileged if they have been made 
in the furtherance of an unlawful or criminal purpose") . "In such 
cases [the physician-patient privilege] has no public policy or social 
value." Green v. State, 274 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ind. 1971). 
In keeping with the foregoing principles, courts generally refuse 
to allow the privilege to be invoked by those accused of obtaining 
drugs by manipulating their doctors. For example, State v. Garrett, 
456 N.E.2d 1319, 1320 (Ohio App. 1983), involved a patient who 
obtained a prescription for sleeping pills, then two days later 
obtained a second prescription by falsely claiming that the first 
prescription had been stolen. The physician testified that if he 
had known that the first prescription had not in fact been stolen, 
he would not have written the second. Id. 
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that defendant sought 
the services of his doctor, "not as a result of a disease or disorder 
suffered by defendant, but, rather, for the obtaining of an illegal 
drug by the use of false statements to the physician." Id. at 1319. 
Thus, it held, the statutory physician-patient privilege "does not 
12 
make inadmissible the testimony of a physician regarding false 
statements made to said physician by a person seeking a prescription 
for an illegal drug where there is no evidence that the drug was 
obtained by said person for the treatment of any medical illness, 
disease or disorder." Id. at 1322. 
To the same effect is State v. Thomale, 317 N.W.2d 147 (S.D. 
1982) . There, the defendant claimed he had lost his medication and 
requested his doctor to write a prescription for the medication. 
Id. at 148. The court affirmed, stating, "Since the statements made 
by defendant to [the doctor] were made for the purpose of obtaining 
possession of controlled substances rather than to cure or alleviate 
an illness, the conversation was not privileged . . ." Ld. See also 
Finney v. State, 623 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Ark. App. 1981) (physician-
patient privilege does not bar doctor's testimony in trial on 
prescription forgery charge); Sharp v. State, 569 N.E.2d 962, 965 
(Ind. App. 1991) ("We hold that when . . . the patient on whose behalf 
a prescription is written is a defendant in a criminal prosecution 
involving the prescription, the prescription is not privileged"); 
but see People v. Sinski, 669 N.E.2d 809(N.Y. 1996). 
These principles apply here. Although all six doctors did 
diagnose and treat defendant (who was in fact ill), nevertheless, 
his purpose in consulting them was to fraudulently obtain controlled 
substances. Any one of the six might have legitimately prescribed 
a single narcotic and, in fact, defendant was not charged in 
13 
connection with Dr. Bergeson's initial prescriptions (R. 232-33). 
Defendant's purpose in consulting multiple doctors was criminal, 
not medical. 
The policy of the physician-patient privilege is to "encourage 
and permit the patient freely to impart to the doctor any information 
which is necessary, or will be helpful, to the physician in 
prescribing or acting for the patient." Clawson v. Walgreen Drug 
Co., 162 P.2d 759, 770 (Utah 1945) (Larson, C.J., concurring and 
dissenting) . To permit defendant, under the cloak of the privilege, 
to affirmatively mislead physicians would offend both the policy 
of the privilege and the language of rule 506(b) . For this reason, 
his rule 506 claim should be rejected. 
B. Defendant' s broad reading of rule 506 would effectively 
nullify the prescription fraud statute. 
Defendant's rule 506 claim fails for a second reason. The trial 
court ruled that applying rule 506(b) in the context of this case 
would be inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1993), 
which criminalizes the obtaining of controlled substances by 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure (R. 151). The court was correct: 
permitting a defendant to invoke the physician-patient privilege 
against a charge of prescription fraud would render the crime 
impossible to prosecute. In effect, the court ruled that defendant's 
statements to the doctors proved "an element of any claim or defense," 
and thus fell within the rule' s exception. See Utah R. Evid. 506 (d) . 
14 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1993) reads in pertinent 
part: "It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
. . . to obtain a prescription for . . . any controlled substance 
by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source . . ." 
This statute does not criminalize obtaining multiple 
prescriptions, but obtaining any prescription by misrepresentation 
or fraudulent non-disclosure. Therefore, the prosecution cannot 
establish its case through pharmaceutical records alone; the doctor 
must testify to the patient's fraudulent communications. To hold 
the physician-patient privilege applicable in such cases would 
effectively grant immunity to all perpetrators of this crime. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals drew a similar conclusion in People 
v. Johnson, 314 N.W.2d 631 (Mich. App. 1981) . Suffering from acute 
bronchitis, defendant consulted his physician, who prescribed fifteen 
tablets of pentazocine, a controlled substance. Jd. at 632. However, 
before filling the prescription, defendant altered the prescription, 
changing the "15" to a "45." Jd. He was prosecuted for obtaining 
a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, 
deception, or subterfuge. Id. 
The court of appeals ruled the physician-patient privilege was 
not available on these facts. "The prescription could only be 
verified by the physician who issued it. Without the doctor's 
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testimony, convictions for forgeries of prescriptions would be well-
nigh impossible." Id. at 634. 
"Like statutes, court rules are construed to avoid absurd 
results." State v. Kelly, 808 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wash. App. 1991). 
They should also be construed "to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Utah R. Evid. 102. 
Construing the physician-patient privilege in a manner to effectively 
nullify a substantive criminal statute would not serve these ends. 
The trial court correctly refused to do so here. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE DOCTORS' TESTIMONY 
AT HIS PRELIMINARY HEARING WAIVED ANY OTHERWISE APPLICABLE 
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AT TRIAL 
Assuming arguendo that the physician-patient privilege applied 
here, defendant waived the privilege by failing to assert it when 
the doctors testified in his preliminary hearing. 
In opposing defendant's motion to suppress at trial, the 
prosecutor argued that defendant had already waived any 
physician/patient privilege by not objecting when his physicians 
testified in the preliminary hearing: "once waived, always waived" 
(R. 146-48) . Defense counsel argued that he had objected, but that 
his objection had been overruled (R. 147) . The prosecutor did not 
recall that an objection based on privilege had been lodged (R. 147) . 
The trial court rejected the State's argument, ruling that non-
objection at the preliminary constituted waiver "as far as that 
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hearing was concerned, but would not be effective at subsequent 
hearings'7 (R. 150). However, it added, "If I'm wrong on that I'd 
like an appellate court to so advise me" (id. ) . The trial was in 
fact wrong on this point. 
At the preliminary hearing, Drs. Russell Anderson, Cory Johnson, 
Bruce Isaacson, Glenn Mortensen, Douglas Hyldahl, and Lars Bergeson 
all testified without objection on the ground of physician-patient 
privilege (see R. 403: 6-83). These are the same doctors who 
testified at trial (see R. 216-93). 
The physician-patient privilege may of course be waived. Clawson 
v. Walgreen Drug Co. , 162 P.2d 759,763 (Utah 1945) . Failure to object 
to evidence on privilege grounds constitutes waiver of the privilege. 
See State v. Scott, 491S.W.2d514, 519 (Mo. 197 3) (en banc) ; Hughson 
v. St. Francis Hoso. of Port Jervis, 463 N.Y.S.2d 224, 230 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. App. 1983); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 140 (Wyo. 1986); 
McCormick § 102; 81 Am.Jur. Witnesses § 511 (1992). 
Furthermore, courts generally hold that "once waived, whether 
at a former trial or otherwise, a patient cannot reassert his or 
her privilege." State v. Mincev, 687 P.2d 1180, 1194 (Az.), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 1040 (1984) ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 
804, 805 (3d Cir. 1979); Novak v. Rathnam, 478 N.E.2d 1334, 1337 
(111. 1985); Hamilton v. Verdow, 414 A.2d 914, 919 (Md. App. 1980); 
State v. Bishop, 453 A.2d 1365, 1368 (N.J. App. 1982) ; State v. Smith, 
929 P.2d 1191, 1197 (Wash App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 662 
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A.2d 610, 614-15 (1995), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1053 (1996); but 
see Johnson, 314 N.W.2d at 633. 
Thus Wigmore writes that "the original disclosure [of privileged 
information] takes away once and for all the confidentiality sought 
to be protected by the privilege. To enforce it thereafter is to 
seek to preserve a privacy which exists in legal fiction only." 
8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2389, at 860-61 (McNaughten rev. 
1961) (emphasis omitted). 
Similarly, a popular dictum observes that "when a secret is 
out, it is out for all time, and cannot be caught again like a bird, 
and put back in its cage." People v. Al-Kanani, 307 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. 
1973) (citations omitted) , cert, denied, 417 U.S. 916 (1974). Thus, 
to resuscitate the privilege after its waiver "would simply be an 
obstruction to public justice." Id. 
Accordingly, defendant's failure to assert the privilege when 
the doctors testified at his preliminary hearing constituted a waiver 
as to trial as well. The trial judge's ruling on this point was 
mistaken and this Court may, in his words, "so advise [him]" (R. 
150) by affirming on this alternative ground. See State v. South, 
924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT and PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents novel issues of law, the State requests 
that oral argument be held and tjjat a published opinion issue. 
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ADDENDUM 
Relevant statutes and rules 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
53-17a-604. Medication profiles. 
(1) (a) Each pharmacy shall establish a medication profile 
system for pharmacy patients according to sta.nda.rcis 
established by division rules made in collaboration with 
the board. 
(b) The rules shall indicate the method for recording ail 
prescription information. 
(2) The pharmacy shall maintain the medication profile for 
any pharmacy patient who expresses a desire for that profes-
sional service. 
(3) The pharmacy may charge an appropriate professional 
fee for this service and for copying or providing information in 
me medication profile to another authorized person. 
(4) A pharmacist, pharmacy intern, or pharmacy technician 
may ^oi release or discuss the information contained in a 
prescription or patient's medication profile to anyone except: 
(a) the pharmacy patient in person or the pharmacy 
patient's legal guardian or designee; -
(b) a lawfiiily authorized federal, state, or local drug 
enforcement officer; 
(c) a third party payment program administered under 
terms authorized by the pharmacy patient; 
(d) a pharmacist, pharmacy intern!, or pharmacy tech-
nician providing pharmacy services to the patient or a 
prescribing practitioner providing professional- services to 
the patient; 
(e) another pharmacist, pharmacy intern, pharmacy 
technician, or prescribing practitioner to whom the pa-
dent has requested a prescription transfer; or 
(f) the pharmacy patient's attorney, after the presenta-
tion of a written authorization signed by the: 
(i) patient, before a notary public; 
(ii) parent or lawful guardian, if the patient is a 
minor; 
(iii) lawful guardian,.if the patient is fncompetent; 
or 
(iv) personal representative, if the patient is de-
ceased. 1396 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
D) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child* as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(aXii) through 
(2)(aXvii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or famish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of. to procure or atfpmpt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter, 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation ofthis section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law, 
(b) Where violation ofthis chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to V2 the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9)(b). 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 «**! 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his profesisional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act wno 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
78-24-8. Privileged communications. 
There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the 
law to encourage conndence and to preserve it inviolate. 
Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness in the 
following cases: 
(1) (a) Neither a wife nor a husband may either during 
the marriage or afterwards be, without the consent of 
the other, examined as to any communication made 
by one to the other during the marriage. 
(b) This exception does not apply: 
(i) to a civil action or proceeding by one spouse 
against the other; 
(ii) to a criminal action or proceeding for a 
crime committed by one spouse against the other; 
(iii) to the crime of deserting or neglecting to 
support a spouse or child; 
(iv) to any civil or criminal proceeding for 
abuse or neglect committed against the child of 
either spouse; or 
(v) if otherwise specifically provided by law. 
(2) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his 
client, be examined as to any communication made by the 
client to him or bis advice given regarding the communi-
cation in the course of his professional employment. An 
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk cannot be 
examined, without the consent of his employer, concern-
ing any fact, the knowledge of which Ha* been acquired in 
his capacity as an employee. 
(3) A clergyman or priest rannot, without the consent of 
the person making the confession, be examined as to any 
confession made to him in his professional character in 
the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he 
belongs. 
(4) A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent 
of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any 
information acquired in attending the patient which was 
necessary *o enable him to prescribe or act for the patient. 
However, this privilege shall be deemed to be waived by 
the patient in an action in which the patient places his 
medical condition at issue as an element or factor of his 
claim or defense. Under those circumstances, a physician 
or surgeon who has prescribed for or treated that patient 
for the medical condition at issue may provide informa-
tion, interviews, reports, records, statements, memo-
randa, or other data relating to the patient's medical 
condition and treatment which are placed at issue. 
(5) A public officer cannot be examined as to communi-
cations made to Him in official confidence when the public 
interests would suifer by the disclosure. 
(6) A sexual assault counselor as denned in Section 
78-3c-3 cannot, without the consent of the victim, be 
examined in a civil or criminal proceeding as to any 
confidential communication as defined in Section 78-3c-3 
made by the victim. i«o 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) ^Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by 
a physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the 
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in amy state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably 
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician, 
psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, 
advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric 
mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that person is 
engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, 
including alcohol or drug addition. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confi-
dence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has 
a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice 
given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by 
examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, 
a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in 
the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental 
health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who 
are present to further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the 
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health 
therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the 
physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the privilege 
on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication relevant 
to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any 
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or, 
after the patient's death, in amy proceedings in which any party relies upon the 
condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an 
issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental 
health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that 
the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the course of, 
and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of the physical, 
mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or witness, unless 
the court in ordering the examination specifies otherwise. 
(Amended effective July 1, 1994.) 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 507, Miscellaneous matters. 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of 
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or 
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to 
the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails 
to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does 
not apply if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication* 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not 
admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclosure was 
(1) compelled erroneously or 
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. 
(c)(1) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of privilege, whether 
in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of 
comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(2) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. Injury cases, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of 
claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury. 
(3) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might 
draw an adverse inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to instruction 
that no inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not 
apply when the privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked. 
